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Received an Unclear Claim or Defence? Here's What You Can Do

In litigation, it is not uncommon for one party to feel that the other side’s case is unclear, vague, or missing important details. A claim or defence may contain broad allegations without properly explaining what is being alleged, how losses are calculated, or what factual basis the other party relies upon. In these situations, the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”), in particular CPR Part 18 and its Practice Direction, set out a procedure allowing parties to request clarification or additional information about matters in dispute 

What is a Request for Further Information? 

A Request for Further Information is a formal request asking another party to clarify matters contained in their statement of case, such as the Particulars of Claim or Defence. 

Statements of case are important because they define the issues in dispute and allow each party to understand the case they must meet.  Where a statement of case lacks sufficient detail, the opposing party may serve a CPR Part 18 Request seeking further clarification or information before the matter progresses further, provided this is reasonably necessary and proportionate to understanding or preparing their own case. 

When Might a Request Be Necessary? 

A request for further information may be appropriate where: 

• allegations are vague or unclear;  

• important facts or dates are missing;  

• losses have not been properly explained;  

• contractual terms relied upon have not been identified; or  

• the defence does not clearly explain why liability is denied.  

For example, a claimant may allege breach of contract without specifying which contractual term was breached or how the breach occurred. Clarifying these issues early can help narrow the dispute, avoid unnecessary costs, and assist parties in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the case. 

Is There a Formal Procedure? 

Under CPR Part 18 and Practice Direction 18, a party seeking clarification should first serve a written Request on the other side, stating the information sought and a reasonable date for a response. Requests should be concise, focused, and strictly confined to matters reasonably necessary and proportionate to prepare the requesting party’s own case or to understand the case they have to meet. If the responding party refuses to clarify their position or provides an inadequate response, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring a response, but the court retains a wide discretion whether to grant such an order having regard to relevance and proportionality. Parties should therefore be cautious when making requests; overly broad or unnecessary requests may be challenged and could have costs consequences. 

What Are the Limits? 

A Request for Further Information is not intended to be a “fishing expedition” or a way to obtain all of the other side’s evidence before disclosure. 

The court may refuse requests that are: 

• overly broad;  

• disproportionate; or  

• unnecessary for resolving the real issues in dispute.  

Careful drafting and strategic consideration are therefore important. 

Conclusion 

Requests for Further Information can be an important procedural and strategic tool in litigation. They may help clarify the issues in dispute, identify weaknesses in the opposing party’s case, and avoid unnecessary delays or costs later in proceedings. 

However, deciding whether a request is appropriate, how it should be drafted, and how to respond to requests from the opposing party often requires careful legal and tactical consideration. 

As a multilingual law firm, Chan Neill Solicitors LLP regularly advises UK and international clients on commercial disputes, civil litigation, and court proceedings. Our experienced dispute resolution team provides strategic and commercially focused advice at every stage of a claim.

If you require advice on a dispute or have received court documents, please contact our team to discuss your matter.

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Family law Case study 1: International Relocation of a Child

Permission Secured for International Relocation of a Child After a Contested Final Hearing

International relocation cases are among the most sensitive and complex disputes that arise following separation. They involve far more than one parent wishing to move abroad. The court must carefully consider the child’s welfare, the child’s relationship with both parents, the practical arrangements in the proposed new country, and whether meaningful contact can continue after relocation.

Our Family Law team recently represented a parent in a difficult and contested application for permission to relocate permanently overseas with their child.

The application was opposed by the other parent, who sought to prevent the child from being removed from the United Kingdom. The case involved a young child, separated parents, cross-border family circumstances, immigration uncertainty, language considerations, and strongly held concerns about how relocation would affect the child’s relationship with the parent remaining in the UK.

Following a two-day final hearing, the court granted permission for the child to relocate permanently overseas with our client.

The background to the dispute

Our client was the child’s primary carer and wished to relocate abroad for reasons connected to long-term stability, employment, housing, and the practical support available in the proposed new country.

The other parent opposed the move. Their position was that the child should remain in the United Kingdom so that the existing relationship between parent and child could continue through regular in-person contact. They were concerned that relocation would reduce their role in the child’s life and that contact would become too dependent on travel and remote communication.

The case was particularly sensitive because the child had already experienced international change in their young life. The proposed relocation therefore had to be considered very carefully. It was not enough to show that the move would benefit our client. The case had to demonstrate that the proposed relocation was properly planned, realistic, and focused on the child’s welfare.

The central issue: the child’s welfare

In cases involving children, the child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration.

This meant the court had to look beyond the wishes of either parent and consider what arrangement would best meet the child’s overall needs. That included the child’s emotional welfare, education, home life, relationship with both parents, stability, and long-term security.

The opposing parent raised concerns about the child’s wishes and feelings, the importance of direct contact, and the possible emotional impact of another move. These concerns had to be handled with care. A relocation case can quickly become polarised, but the court’s focus remains on the child rather than the conflict between the parents.

Our client accepted that the child had worries about moving and did not seek to minimise those feelings. Instead, the case was presented on the basis that the child’s concerns could be properly supported through a careful transition, clear routines, emotional reassurance, and continuing meaningful contact with the other parent.

A carefully planned relocation proposal

A successful relocation application requires detailed preparation. The court will usually want to understand what the child’s life will look like after the move, not only in broad terms but in practical day-to-day terms.

In this case, our client’s proposals addressed the child’s home, education, emotional adjustment, friendships, healthcare, travel, and ongoing relationship with the other parent.

The proposed arrangements included a stable home environment abroad, suitable schooling, a plan to support the child’s transition, a support network in the new country, and arrangements for the child to continue spending time with the other parent.

A key part of the case was showing that the relocation was not speculative. Our client had considered where the child would live, how schooling would work, how the child would be supported emotionally, and how contact would continue across borders.

This level of preparation was essential. The court had to be satisfied that the proposed move was not simply desirable from the relocating parent’s perspective, but workable and beneficial when viewed through the lens of the child’s welfare.

Addressing the child’s emotional needs

One of the most important aspects of the case was the child’s emotional adjustment.

The child had expressed some anxiety about the proposed move. This was entirely understandable. Moving country can be unsettling for a child, particularly where it involves leaving familiar surroundings, friends, school, and one parent remaining in another country.

Our client’s case therefore placed significant emphasis on how the child would be supported before, during, and after the relocation.

The proposed transition focused on reassurance, predictability, and continuity. The child would be helped to understand the move in a calm and age-appropriate way. Familiar belongings and routines would be preserved as far as possible. The child’s friendships would be supported. New activities and opportunities would be introduced gradually rather than all at once.

The aim was to show that the relocation would not be an abrupt or unmanaged disruption. Instead, it would be a carefully planned transition with the child’s emotional needs at the centre.

Preserving the child’s relationship with the other parent

A major concern in any international relocation case is whether the child’s relationship with the other parent can be maintained.

In this case, the other parent had a meaningful relationship with the child and was understandably concerned that relocation would affect the time they spent together. This was one of the most significant issues in the proceedings.

Our client’s position was not that the other parent’s role should be reduced. On the contrary, our client accepted the importance of that relationship and proposed arrangements to preserve it.

The final arrangements provided for the child to spend substantial holiday time with the other parent, including extended periods during school holidays. The arrangements also included regular video and telephone contact so that the parent-child relationship could continue between in-person visits.

This was an important feature of the outcome. The court was able to approve relocation while also putting in place a structure that allowed the child to maintain a meaningful relationship with the parent remaining behind.

Practical challenges across borders

The case also involved practical cross-border issues.

International child arrangements require careful thought. It is not enough to say that contact will happen. The court must be able to see how it will happen.

The case involved questions about travel, costs, handovers, documentation, immigration issues, and what would happen if circumstances changed in the future. There were also language considerations during the proceedings, with interpreter assistance required.

The other parent’s immigration position added another layer of complexity. It raised questions about whether they would be able to travel, whether they would remain in the UK long term, and how contact could be managed if their circumstances changed.

Our client addressed these issues by putting forward practical and flexible arrangements. This included proposals for the child’s travel, responsibility for travel costs, and continued cooperation in relation to documentation and contact.

The court ultimately made an order that allowed relocation while also providing for the child’s ongoing relationship with the other parent through both direct and indirect contact.

The contested final hearing

The matter proceeded to a contested final hearing over two days.

At the hearing, the court had to consider the competing positions of both parents. The parent opposing relocation argued that the child should remain in the UK and that the move would negatively affect the child’s relationship with them. Our client’s case was that relocation was in the child’s best interests when viewed as part of a carefully considered long-term plan.

The court had to weigh the emotional, practical, and welfare issues in the round.

Following the hearing, the court granted permission for the child to relocate permanently overseas with our client. The order also provided for the child to live with our client and for the other parent to continue spending meaningful time with the child through structured holiday contact and regular remote communication.

The outcome

This was a significant result in a sensitive and contested case.

The court granted permission for permanent relocation overseas. The previous restriction preventing removal from the UK was discharged. The child was permitted to move abroad with our client, and arrangements were made to preserve the child’s relationship with the other parent.

The outcome allowed our client to move forward with greater long-term stability while ensuring that the child’s relationship with both parents remained properly recognised.

Why this case was complex

This case was challenging for several reasons.

It involved an opposed international relocation application, a young child with emotional concerns about moving, the need to preserve the relationship with the parent remaining in the UK, cross-border travel arrangements, immigration uncertainty, and practical issues about education, housing, and support abroad.

The court had to consider not only whether relocation was suitable, but whether the proposals were realistic, properly planned, and genuinely focused on the child.

The case required careful evidence, strategic preparation, and sensitive presentation. It also required a balanced approach. Relocation cases should not be presented as though one parent’s relationship with the child no longer matters. The stronger approach is often to show how relocation can take place while still respecting and supporting the child’s relationship with both parents.

What this case shows

This case demonstrates the importance of early specialist legal advice in international relocation matters.

Parents often underestimate how much preparation is required. A relocation application is not simply about explaining why a parent wants to move. The court will need to understand how the move will affect the child, how the child will be supported, what arrangements will be in place abroad, and how the child’s relationship with the other parent will continue.

Equally, parents opposing relocation need clear advice about the legal principles, the evidence required, and the options available to protect their relationship with the child.

Every family is different, and every relocation case turns on its own facts. However, this case highlights the importance of presenting a clear, realistic and child-focused case from the outset.

Specialist advice on international relocation and child arrangements

At Chan Neill Solicitors LLP, our Family Law team advises parents on complex child arrangements disputes, including international relocation cases.

We can assist if you are seeking permission to relocate abroad with your child, or if you are concerned that your child may be moved overseas without your agreement.

We also advise on child arrangements orders, prohibited steps orders, specific issue orders, cross-border contact arrangements, and urgent applications where there is a risk of a child being removed from the jurisdiction.

International relocation cases require careful strategy, detailed preparation and sensitive handling. Obtaining advice at an early stage can make a significant difference to how your case is prepared and presented.

For advice on international relocation, child arrangements or any other family law matter, please contact our Family Law team.

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Protecting Yourself and Your Home: Non-Molestation and Occupation Orders

We understand that situations involving domestic abuse or conflict within a relationship can be extremely difficult. Taking the step to seek legal protection is not always easy, and you may feel unsure about what options are available.

The law provides protective measures designed to safeguard your wellbeing and living arrangements. Non-molestation orders and occupation orders can offer important protection in the right circumstances.

Seeking early advice can help you understand which option is most suitable, so that we can work with you to find the best solution for your situation.

Non-Molestation Orders (NMOs)

A non-molestation order is intended to protect you from harassment, threats, or abuse from someone you are legally classes as an ‘associated person’ with, such as a partner, former partner, spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, civil partner, former civil partner, or certain family members.

How it helps

A non-molestation order can:

• Prevent the other person from contacting you directly or indirectly
• Stop threatening, abusive, harassing or intimidating behaviour
• Restrict them from coming near your home or workplace, or other specified places.

It is particularly useful where behaviour has become distressing, unsafe or controlling.

Key considerations

• The focus is on behaviour rather than property or living arrangements
• It is available where there is evidence of domestic abuse, harassment, threats or controlling or coercive behaviour
• Breaching the order is a criminal offence and can result in arrest and possible prosecution.

When it may be needed

You may consider a non-molestation order if you are experiencing:

• Domestic abuse or threats
• Harassment or repeated unwanted contact
• Controlling or coercive behaviour

Occupation Orders

An occupation order deals with who is entitled to occupy the family home and whether a person should be required to leave or be excluded from it.

How it helps

An occupation order can:

• Require one person to leave the property or be excluded from the property
• Allow you to remain safely in the home
• Set clear boundaries within the property if both parties remain (for example, allocating parts of the home or setting rules about the use)

This is particularly important where living together is no longer safe or practical.

Key considerations

• The focus is on occupation rights rather than behaviour (although evidence of abuse and safety concerns is highly relevant)
• The court considers factors such as housing needs, safety, financial resources and the welfare of any children
• The balance of harm test may be applied, meaning the court weighs whether the applicant or any relevant child is likely to suffer from significant harm if the order is not made, against any harm the order would cause the respondent.

When it may be needed

You may consider an occupation order if:

• You need to remain in the home for safety or stability
• There is conflict over who should live in the property
• Living arrangements have broken down following separation

Why both orders are often used together

In many cases, both orders are sought at the same time to provide comprehensive protection.

• A non-molestation order addresses the behaviour
• An occupation order addresses the living arrangements

Together, they can ensure both personal safety and a stable home environment, particularly where there is an ongoing risk or shared living space.

How we can support you

Our team is experienced in advising on non-molestation and occupation orders. We can guide you through understanding your options, assess what protection is appropriate, and guide you through the process step by step. Where urgent action is required, we can act quickly to help secure protection.

We also recognise that many of our clients come from international backgrounds. As a trilingual team, we provide clear and practical advice in English, Mandarin and Cantonese, ensuring you fully understand your options and feel supported throughout.

If you would like to speak to us in confidence, please contact our family law team.

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Financial Remedy Proceedings in Divorce: A Practical Guide

When a marriage comes to an end, resolving financial matters is often one of the most complex and important aspects of the process. A divorce itself does not automatically determine how assets, income, or liabilities should be divided. This is where financial remedy proceedings come into play.

What is a Financial Remedy?

A financial remedy is the legal process used to determine how finances are divided between separating spouses or civil partners following a divorce or dissolution.

It can deal with a wide range of financial issues, including:

• Division of property (such as the family home)
• Savings, investments, and pensions
• Maintenance (spousal or child)
• Business assets
• Debts and liabilities

The court’s objective is to reach a fair outcome, taking into account the circumstances of both parties. Importantly, without a formal financial order approved by the court, financial claims can remain open even after divorce.

What is a Financial Remedy for?

Financial remedy proceedings are designed to:

• Achieve a fair distribution of assets
• Ensure both parties’ needs are met, particularly housing and income needs
• Provide financial certainty and finality
• Protect future claims through a legally binding court order

This is particularly important in cases involving significant assets, children, or ongoing financial dependency.

The Financial Remedy Process

While every case differs, financial remedy proceedings typically follow a structured court process:

Types of Financial Orders

The court has a wide discretion and can make a range of orders, including:

• Property adjustment orders, such as the transfer or sale of property
  Lump sum orders
  • Spousal maintenance orders
  • Pension sharing orders

In appropriate cases, the court may also achieve a clean break, bringing an end to ongoing financial obligations between the parties.

Why Legal Advice Matters

Financial remedy proceedings can be complex. Mistakes, especially in disclosure or settlement, can have serious long term consequences.

Early legal advice can help you:

• Understand your legal position and what you may be entitled to
• Approach negotiations with a clear and informed strategy
• Avoid unnecessary court proceedings where possible
• Ensure any agreement is properly documented and legally binding

How We Can Help

Our family law team can support you at every stage of financial remedy proceedings, from advising on your financial position and likely outcomes to negotiating settlements and representing you in mediation. We also assist with preparing and reviewing financial disclosure, acting for you in court where necessary, and working towards a clean break where appropriate.

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Litigation Essay Competition 2026: Winners Announced

Chan Neill Solicitors LLP are delighted to announce the winners of this year’s Litigation Essay Competition!

With over 45 entries submitted from 26 universities across the UK, the standard of work was exceptionally high. The competition was fiercely contested, showcasing impressive analytical ability, originality, and written advocacy from all who participated.

[Winner]:

Katherine O'Toole:

• “Ignorance is not a Defence”: Traditional Principle and Modern Limits

[Her essay stood out for its clarity, depth of research, and compelling legal reasoning.]

[Runners‑Up]:

Danielle Bugden

• The “Mazur decision” has sent shockwaves throughout the litigation market. What areas within the litigation sphere have been most impacted, and what steps should be taken to ensure compliance?

Simon Raivid:

• Part 36 offers of settlement serve the purpose of ensuring parties to litigation seriously consider settlement. However, to what extent can Part 36 settlement offers be strategically misused and/or abused, and how?

A huge thank you to everyone who took part — the calibre of entries made this year’s competition truly remarkable.

Read more about the winning essays, our judging process, and future opportunities on our website: Litigation Essay Competition 2026 - Chan Neill Solicitors LLP

We look forward to seeing more brilliant work in future competition

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Litigation Essay Competition 2026: Part 36 Settlement Offers – Strategic Use and Misuse

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026.

Simon Raivid examines the role of Part 36 offers in litigation, considering both their intended purpose and how they may be used strategically in practice.

Part 36 Settlement Offers – Strategic Use and Misuse

Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rests on a simple premise, parties who face real costs consequences for rejecting a reasonable offer will settle more readily, and courts will be spared unnecessary trials.[1] Where a defendant fails to beat a claimant's offer at trial, the defendant bears post-relevant-period costs.[2] Where a claimant beats their own offer, they receive indemnity costs, enhanced interest, and an additional payment of up to £75,000.[3] The threat is real, and in countless cases it works.

The difficulty is structural. Part 36's consequences are largely automatic; once a compliant offer is made and not beaten, costs follow with minimal judicial intervention, subject only to a narrow discretion to disapply them where it would be 'unjust' to do so.[4] A procedural mechanism that operates irrespective of good faith is one that sophisticated parties can and do deploy in bad faith. This essay argues that Part 36 is susceptible to systematic misuse traceable to three structural features; the binary nature of its enhanced consequences, the freedom to withdraw offers without sanction, and its tension with the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost.[5] The courts' safeguards are real but insufficient. The regime requires structural reform.

1.  The Pressure Offer: Coercion Dressed as Settlement

The most common form of misuse is the pressure offer, a compliant offer made not in expectation of acceptance, but to create a costs risk rendering the opposing party's litigation economically unviable. Part 36 is applied strictly as a self-contained code[6], and the offeror's motive is irrelevant to whether the consequences follow. A defendant in a personal injury claims worth £18,000 who makes a Part 36 offer of £10,000 early in proceedings does not necessarily want acceptance. If the claimant recovers £17,500 at trial, the defendant recovers its post-relevant-period costs, which may well exceed the damages awarded. A claimant who wins their case is left out of pocket. The economics of proceeding become irrational, and Part 36 has coerced a settlement that the merits did not justify.

The Court of Appeal recognised this danger in Carver v BAA plc[7], where Smith LJ emphasised that the regime must not operate oppressively. That concern, however, produced no structural remedy. The 2015 amendments restored the strict approach and left the underlying incentive structure intact. The pressure offer remains entirely lawful, a point Briggs LJ acknowledged in Sugar Hut Group Ltd v AJ Insurance Service[8] when noting the 'well-recognised' risk of tactical Part 36 use in modest-value claims.

2. The Near-Miss Trap: a Cliff Edge, Not a Sliding Scale

The most acutely exploited structural feature is the binary nature of the enhanced consequences; beat an offer by any margin and the full package under r.36.17(4) follows regardless of how small the excess. The 'unjust' discretion is applied sparingly; in Huck v Robson[9] upheld full consequences on a small margin to preserve predictability. Broadhurst v Tan[10] confirmed proportionality plays no role even in low-value claims. This is not a nuanced incentive; it is a cliff edge.

Consider a claim both parties assess at between £90,000 and £110,000. A claimant's offer of £88,000 carries minimal risk; if the award falls below, she recovers standard costs as a successful party; if it exceeds £88,000, the full consequences trigger automatically. The offer serves no conciliatory purpose. As Sorabji has observed, this is Part 36 deployed to extract money by procedural means rather than to resolve disputes.[11] That observation captures something the courts have acknowledged but the legislature has not addressed.

III.  Withdrawal, Inequality and the Information Problem

A subtler form of manipulation exploits the withdrawal provisions. After the relevant period, a Part 36 offer may be withdrawn without the court's permission.[12] This permits an offeror to make an attractive offer, induce the opponent to forego protective steps, then withdraw at a tactically opportune moment, leaving them exposed. In Flynn v Scougall[13], the Court of Appeal confirmed that withdrawal after the relevant period is generally permissible. Rix LJ's observation in Tibbles v SIG plc[14] that the court retains residual ability to consider whether 'apparent compliance is in substance a manipulation' is theoretically welcome, but the narrow 'unjust' discretion means tactical withdrawal is rarely sanctioned.

Information asymmetry compounds these difficulties. A well-resourced party can issue successive Part 36 offers at graduated levels across different procedural stages, forcing the opponent to evaluate each against a shifting litigation landscape. In PHI Group Ltd v Robert West Consulting Ltd[15], the Court of Appeal acknowledged the complexity without providing a workable framework. In multi-defendant cases, a global offer against defendants with divergent risk profiles places disproportionate pressure on the most risk-averse party, and CPR r.36.13 does not fully resolve this.[16] Nor must an offer follow adequate disclosure: a claimant may face full costs consequences from an offer they had no proper basis to evaluate. Courts have engaged the 'unjust' discretion on this basis,[17] but case-by-case intervention cannot remedy a structural gap.

3. The Safety Valves and the Case for Reform

The regime offers three principal responses to misuse. None is structurally adequate. The 'unjust' discretion is deliberately narrow, tactical motivation alone will not engage it, since a formally compliant offer is entitled to its consequences whatever the purpose behind it. Professional conduct obligations confirmed in Medcalf v Mardell[18] may sanction egregious cases, but every pressure offer can be framed as a genuine attempt to avoid trial. General costs discretion (Dunnett; Halsey[19]) supplements Part 36 but cannot correct its structural asymmetries.

Jackson LJ's 2010 Review flagged the risk of Part 36 becoming oppressive,[20] and LASPO 2012 removed success fees as a costs weapon.[21] The 2015 amendments tightened formalities without touching the core asymmetries. Three reforms would make a material difference. First, the enhanced consequences should be calibrated to the margin of success, not triggered in full at any excess; this would eliminate the cliff-edge incentive. Second, Part 36 consequences should not arise automatically from an offer made before standard disclosure is complete, absent a court finding of adequate information. Third, where withdrawal follows demonstrable induced reliance, the court should have a more readily accessible power to restore the offeree's costs position. Courts have scrutinised individual offers, as in Littleford v Birmingham City Council[22], but scrutiny without structural precision is insufficient.

Conclusion

Part 36 has changed how civil litigation behaves. But a mechanism that rational litigants routinely deploy not to settle disputes but to distort their economics is failing its purpose. The CPR's overriding objective requires cases to be dealt with justly and at proportionate cost.[23] A regime whose automaticity enables systematic coercion, whose withdrawal rules permit induced reliance to be exploited, and whose information requirements are silent stands in tension with that objective. Part 36 was conceived as a shield against the costs of unnecessary litigation. In skilled hands, it has become a sword. The question for reformers is not whether to blunt it, but whether they have the precision to do so without discarding the shield.

Bibliography

Primary Sources: Legislation

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132), Part 36.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.44.

Primary Sources: Cases

Broadhurst v Tan [2016] EWCA Civ 94; [2016] 1 WLR 1928.

C v D [2011] EWCA Civ 646.

Carver v BAA plc [2008] EWCA Civ 412; [2009] 1 WLR 113.

Dunnett v Railtrack plc [2002] EWCA Civ 303; [2002] 1 WLR 2434.

Flynn v Scougall [2004] EWCA Civ 873; [2004] 3 All ER 609.

Gibbon v Manchester City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 726; [2010] 1 WLR 2081.

Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 WLR 3002.

Huck v Robson [2002] EWCA Civ 398; [2003] 1 WLR 1340.

Littleford v Birmingham City Council [2016] EWHC 2152 (Ch).

Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27; [2003] 1 AC 120.

National Westminster Bank plc v Feeney [2006] EWHC 90066 (Costs).

PHI Group Ltd v Robert West Consulting Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 588.

Sugar Hut Group Ltd v AJ Insurance Service [2016] EWCA Civ 46.

Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518; [2012] 1 WLR 2591.

Books and Reports

Jackson LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO 2010).

Sime S and French D (eds), Blackstone's Civil Practice 2024 (Oxford University Press 2024).

Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013).

Friston M, Civil Costs: Law and Practice (3rd edn, Jordan Publishing 2020).

Articles

Sorabji J, ‘Part 36: A Costs Regime Fit for Purpose?’ (2016) 35 Civil Justice Quarterly 135.

Cook T, ‘Part 36 Offers: Strategic Use, Abuse and Reform’ (2019) 38 Civil Justice Quarterly 212.

[1]Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132), Part 36. The regime is described as a 'self-contained code' in Gibbon v Manchester City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 726, [2010] 1 WLR 2081, per Moore-Bick LJ at [4].

[2]CPR r.36.17(3).

[3]CPR r.36.17(4); r.36.17(4)(d): the additional amount is 10% of the first £500,000 and 5% above that, capped at £75,000.

[4]CPR r.36.17(5)(e); r.36.17(4)(d).

[5]CPR r.1.1(1)–(2): the court must deal with cases 'justly and at proportionate cost', having regard to the parties' respective financial positions.

[6]Gibbon v Manchester City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 726, per Moore-Bick LJ at [4]–[5].

[7]Carver v BAA plc [2008] EWCA Civ 412, [2009] 1 WLR 113, per Smith LJ at [30]–[32]. The decision was effectively reversed by the Civil Procedure (Amendment No 8) Rules 2014 (SI 2014/3299), which restored the strict approach.

[8]Sugar Hut Group Ltd v AJ Insurance Service [2016] EWCA Civ 46, per Briggs LJ at [29].

[9]Huck v Robson [2002] EWCA Civ 398, [2003] 1 WLR 1340, per Schiemann LJ at [72]: the 'unjust' discretion under r.36.17(5)(e) must be invoked sparingly to preserve the regime's deterrent effect.

[10]Broadhurst v Tan [2016] EWCA Civ 94, [2016] 1 WLR 1928, per Moore-Bick LJ at [17]–[19].

[11]J Sorabji, 'Part 36: A Costs Regime Fit for Purpose?' (2016) 35 Civil Justice Quarterly 135, 148; see also A Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) para 26.70.

[12]CPR r.36.9(4): after the relevant period, an offer may be withdrawn by written notice without the court's permission.

[13]Flynn v Scougall [2004] EWCA Civ 873, [2004] 3 All ER 609, per Dyson LJ at [26].

[14]Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518, [2012] 1 WLR 2591, per Rix LJ at [39].

[15]PHI Group Ltd v Robert West Consulting Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 588. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the complexity of competing concurrent offers without providing a clear analytical framework.

[16]CPR r.36.13; Gibbon v Manchester City Council [2010] EWCA Civ 726, per Moore-Bick LJ at [4]–[5], reaffirming that Part 36 must be applied strictly even in complex party configurations.

[17]National Westminster Bank plc v Feeney [2006] EWHC 90066 (Costs), per Master Rogers; C v D [2011] EWCA Civ 646, per Arden LJ at [44].

[18]Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27, [2003] 1 AC 120, per Lord Bingham at [23].

[19]Dunnett v Railtrack plc [2002] EWCA Civ 303, [2002] 1 WLR 2434; Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 1 WLR 3002.

[20]Jackson LJ, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO 2010) ch 41, 455.

[21]Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s.44.

[22]Littleford v Birmingham City Council [2016] EWHC 2152 (Ch).

Written by Simon Raivid

We would like to thank all participants for their submissions and congratulate this year’s winners.

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026. Read more about the competition here:
https://www.cnsolicitors.com/litigation-essay-competition-2026/

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Litigation Essay Competition 2026: The Mazur Decision and Its Impact on Litigation Practice

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026.

Danielle Bugden explores the impact of the Mazur decision on litigation practice, focusing on key areas of change and compliance considerations.

The Mazur Decision and Its Impact on Litigation Practice

The Mazur decision has sent genuine shockwaves through the UK litigation market. For many years, firms operated on the assumption that the conduct of litigation could be carried out by unqualified fee-earners, provided they worked within an authorised firm and were supervised by a solicitor. Entire business models developed on that understanding. In Mazur, however, Mr Justice Sheldon made clear that this assumption was wrong. Properly interpreted, s.21(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007 does not extend authorisation to employees of regulated firms; it merely subjects them to regulatory discipline. The statutory scheme draws a firm line: the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity that may only be exercised by an authorised person or someone falling within a specific statutory exemption. Supervision alone is not enough.

This clarification is more than a technical correction. It challenges the structure of modern litigation practice and raises serious questions about how cases are staffed, managed and costed. The decision has particularly significant implications for bulk litigation firms, costs recovery, and access to justice. This essay argues that Mazur exposes a structural tension between theory and litigation practice, and that meaningful compliance will require changes to case management systems, internal supervision models and professional accountability frameworks.

Context

The starting point is the statutory framework. Under s.12 of the Legal Services Act 2007, the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity[1]. Schedule 2 defines that to include issuing proceedings, performing ancillary functions in relation to proceedings, and any steps required in prosecuting or defending a claim[2]. A reserved legal activity may only be carried out by an authorised person such as a solicitor holding a current practising certificate, or by an exempt person within a defined statutory category[3].

The difficulty in Mazur arose from the interpretation of s.21(3) LSA 2007[4]. Many firms understood this provision to mean that employees of an authorised body were themselves entitled to carry out reserved activities, provided they did under supervision. On that reading, the regulatory status of the firm effectively extended to its staff. Mr Justice Sheldon rejected that construction[5]. Section 21(3), properly understood, ensures that employees of authorised bodies are subject to the same regulatory and disciplinary framework as the body itself; it does not confer authorisation to perform reserved legal activities. Authorisation is personal and statutory, not derivative[6].

The judgment reinforces that an individual is either entitled to conduct litigation or they are not. There is no legal supervised authorisation. While unqualified staff may assist with preparatory or administrative tasks, the moment an individual takes a step amounting to issuing proceedings, corresponding formally with the court, or exercising independent judgment, the question becomes one of fact and degree[7]. If that step amounts to the conduct of litigation and the individual are not authorised or exempt, the act is unlawful[8].

This is significant because modern litigation practice often blurs the line between support and conduct. Mazur forces that line back into sharp focus.

The Impacted Areas

The most immediate and significant impact of Mazur will be felt by firms operating high-volume litigation models. Bulk personal injury and conveyancing practices have structures in which large numbers of paralegals manage substantial caseloads under the supervision of a smaller cohort of solicitors. That model is only sustainable if supervision is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Mazur makes clear that it is not. If the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity,[9] then the individual performing that conduct must be personally authorised under s13.[10] Supervision cannot convert unauthorised into authorised.

This has structural implications. If paralegals are corresponding substantively with the court, issuing proceedings, signing statements of truth, or exercising independent procedural judgment, those steps may amount in substance to the conduct of litigation. If so, and the individual is not authorised or exempt, the act is unlawful.[11] For firms whose profitability depends on delegation at scale, compliance will require either a significant increase in authorised fee-earner involvement or a fundamental redesign of case allocation models. The decision therefore strikes at the economic foundations of commoditised litigation.

A second area of acute impact is costs recovery. Where a bill of costs reflects substantial time spent by unqualified fee-earners undertaking tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation, paying parties are likely to scrutinise those entries. If work was performed unlawfully, arguments may arise as to whether the costs are irrecoverable on grounds of illegality or lack of entitlement. The Court of Appeal has previously emphasised that the statutory prohibition on unauthorised practice is a matter of substance rather than form.[12] Mazur provides defendants and insurers with a framework to challenge whether tasks were properly chargeable as litigation work. Even where proceedings themselves are not struck out, the costs consequences may be significant.

There are also procedural risks. The Civil Procedure Rules require that statements of case be verified by a statement of truth,[13] and that certain documents be signed by a legal representative where one is instructed.[14] If a statement of case is issued or signed by an individual not entitled to conduct litigation, questions may arise as to the validity of the step taken. While the courts are reluctant to invalidate proceedings for procedural irregularity alone,[15] Mazur introduces the possibility that what appeared to be a mere irregularity may involve a breach of a statutory prohibition. That distinction matters. It increases the risk of satellite litigation concerning authority, wasted costs orders against firms,[16] and potential professional negligence exposure.

Beyond commercial firms, the decision has broader consequences. Legal aid providers, law centres and local authorities often rely on paralegals and CILEX practitioners progressing toward independent practice rights. Restricting the scope of work that may be undertaken risks increasing the cost-of-service delivery in already strained areas of practice. There is a tension between the regulatory clarity reinforced by Mazur and the realities of access to justice. However, that tension is inherent in the statutory scheme itself. The LSA deliberately reserves certain activities in the public interest.[17] Mazur does not create that restriction; it enforces it.

Taken together, these impacts demonstrate that the decision is not confined to regulatory compliance. It requires firms to reconsider who is conducting litigation on their files, and whether their current structures reflect the personal nature of statutory authorisation.

Steps for Compliance

Mazur confirms that authorisation to conduct litigation is personal and statutory under ss12 and 13 LSA 2007.[18] Compliance therefore requires structural change, not supervision.

First, firms should undertake a targeted audit of files to identify who has been conducting litigation. The relevant question is who has issued proceedings, corresponded formally with the court, signed statements of truth, or exercised independent procedural judgment? If steps were taken by unauthorised individuals, firms must consider corrective action and assess regulatory exposure. The SRA Code of Conduct for Firms requires effective governance, compliance systems and proper supervision.[19] A failure to identify systemic breaches risks compounding the problem.

Secondly, case management processes must ensure that reserved activities are demonstrably carried out by authorised persons. This may include restricting court-filing access, requiring documented solicitor sign-off before issuing proceedings, and clearly recording the exercise of independent judgment by an authorised fee-earner. Such measures provide evidence that the requirement in s13 has been met[20] and reduce disputes concerning the validity of statements of truth under CPR r22.[21]

Thirdly, supervision models must be reassessed. The SRA Principles require solicitors and firms to uphold the rule of law and maintain public trust.[22] Where unauthorised staff effectively conduct litigation autonomously, the issue is not merely procedural but regulatory. In high-volume environments, this may require lower supervision ratios or greater authorised involvement in strategic decisions and pleadings.

Finally, firms should consider reporting and insurance obligations. Where past conduct may breach s14 LSA 2007,[23] managers must evaluate whether a serious breach is reportable to the SRA.[24] Early remediation is likely to carry less regulatory risk than disclosure.

Mazur does not prohibit delegation; It requires that delegation stops short of reserved activity unless the individual is authorised. Firms that realign their structures accordingly will be best placed to withstand judicial and regulatory scrutiny.

Conclusion

The Mazur decision is a definitive reminder that the conduct of litigation is a personal statutory entitlement, not a delegable function. Firms can no longer rely on supervision or employment within an authorised body to validate unauthorised practice. The ruling has immediate implications for high-volume litigation models, costs recovery, and access to justice, and exposes structural vulnerabilities in case management and supervision.

Compliance will require deliberate changes: audit of files, documented sign-off for all reserved activities, reassessment of supervision models, and proactive engagement with the SRA where breaches are identified.[25] Firms that embed these measures into their governance structures, rather than treating them as a one-off response, will mitigate regulatory and procedural risk and preserve both client and public confidence in the profession. Mazur is not just a challenge; it is an opportunity to strengthen the integrity and professionalism of litigation practice in the UK.

[1] Legal Sevices Act 2007, s 12(1).

[2] Legal Services Act 2007, sch 2 para 4.

[3] Legal Services Act 2007, s 13.

[4] Legal Services Act 2007, s 21(3).

[5] Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)

[6] Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2005] EWCA Civ 1507, [2006] 1 WLR 2126.

[7] Baxter v Doble [2023] EWHC 486 (KB).

[8] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[9] Legal service Act 2007, s 12(1), sch 2 para 4.

[10] Legal Service Act 2007, s 13.

[11] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[12] Ndole Assets Ltd v Designer M&E Services UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2865.

[13] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1.

[14] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1(6).

[15] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 3.10.

[16]Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 46.8.

[17] Legal Services Act 2007, s 1.

[18] Legal Service Act 2007, ss 12-13.

[19] Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) paras 2.1, 3.2–3.5.

[20] Legal Services Act 2007, s 13.

[21] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1.

[22] Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA Principles (2019) Principles 1–2.

[23] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[24] Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) para 7.7.

[25] Legal Services Act 2007, ss 12–14; Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) paras 2.1, 3.2–3.5, 7.7.

Written by Danielle Bugden

We would like to thank all participants for their submissions and congratulate this year’s winners.

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026. Read more about the competition here:
https://www.cnsolicitors.com/litigation-essay-competition-2026/

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Litigation Essay Competition 2026 Winner: “Ignorance is not a Defence” – Traditional Principle and Modern Limits

This essay was awarded first place in our Litigation Essay Competition 2026.

Katherine O'Toole’s work stood out for its clarity, depth of research, and compelling legal reasoning.

"Ignorance is not a Defence": Traditional Principle and Modern Limits

The Latin maxim ignorantia juris non excusat ("ignorance of the law is no excuse") is a bedrock of English law. Every person is presumed to know the law, so they cannot escape liability by pleading ignorance. This promotes predictability and uniformity: if identical conduct could be lawful for one but punishable for another based on knowledge, the rule of law collapses. It also spares proving a defendant's state of mind about obscure rules and encourages citizens to inform themselves of their duties. In short, a strict rule deters wilful non-compliance with basic social norms.

Yet this absolutist rationale faces challenges in a modern state awash with complex regulation. A recent case, R (Good Law Project Ltd & Ors) v Commission for Equality and Human Rights [2026] EWHC 279 (Admin)^[1], shows how courts reconcile the old maxim with today's realities. The Good Law Project and three individual claimants (an intersex person, a trans woman holding a Gender Recognition Certificate, and a trans man with a pending GRC application) brought judicial review proceedings against the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), arguing that the EHRC's interim guidance on single-sex facilities (published 25 April 2025, after For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16^[2]) misrepresented the law and thereby induced employers to restrict their access to facilities corresponding with their gender identity, in breach of the EHRC's statutory duties under the Equality Act 2006 and the claimants' Article 8 rights. The High Court (Swift J) refused the Good Law Project permission for lack of standing and dismissed the individual claimants' substantive challenges on all three grounds, holding that the guidance accurately stated the law.

1. The Traditional Justification

The traditional justification is threefold: legal certainty (the law must bind uniformly), evidential practicality (proving a defendant knew a specific rule would be unworkable), and deterrence (motivating citizens to learn their obligations). In Good Law Project, Swift J accepted these premises. After For Women Scotland, in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that "woman", "man", and "sex" in the Equality Act (EA) 2010 refer to biological sex rather than "certificated sex" as modified by a GRC, it would be unlawful for an employer to continue a policy premised on the contrary assumption and then plead ignorance. The Court found that the EA 2010 constitutes provision within section 9(3) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004^[3], displacing the general rule in section 9(1) that a GRC changes gender "for all purposes"^[4]; trans persons retain protections through the separate protected characteristic of gender reassignment (EA 2010, s 7)^[5].

2. The Problem of Legal Complexity

However, Good Law Project spotlights a tension: what if even specialists find the law bewildering? For Women Scotland clarified the definition of sex but left many details unsettled: the interplay between that biological definition and existing protections for gender reassignment, or the exceptions for single-sex services (Schedule 3, Part 7, paragraphs 26 to 28^[6]), are far from self-evident. Meanwhile, the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992, Regulation 20(2)(c)^[7], separately requires that "separate rooms containing conveniences are provided for men and women" in the employment context. These are distinct legislative regimes: the 1992 Regulations are health-and-safety provisions under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, not implementations of the Equality Act's exceptions. In other words, the law is so intricate that reasonable people must seek guidance to navigate it.

3. Official Guidance as a Qualified Safe Harbour

The court's reasoning creates a qualified protection for those who follow official advice in good faith. Under section 13(1)(d) of the Equality Act 2006, the EHRC may give advice or guidance on the effect or operation of any enactment^[8]. Swift J held that this power implies a duty to provide accurate statements of law. At paragraph 40, he observed that an employer who "in good faith adopted and applied a policy that the female lavatories were available only to biological women" would satisfy the requirements of Regulation 20^[9].

However, Swift J immediately qualified this at paragraph 42: compliance with Regulation 20 does not exhaust the employer's legal obligations^[10]. The employer must also comply with Part 5 of the EA 2010, including the prohibition on direct and indirect discrimination by reason of gender reassignment^[11]. The consequence of the judgment is not that trans persons must use lavatories corresponding to their biological sex. Rather, the employer faces two coexisting duties: a health and safety obligation to provide sex-separated facilities, and an anti-discrimination obligation under the EA 2010. How these duties are reconciled in practice remains unresolved.

The EHRC's interim update, revised on 24 June 2025 and withdrawn on 15 October 2025, was not retracted on substantive grounds: the EHRC maintained throughout the litigation that the guidance was legally accurate. It withdrew the document to pressure the Minister for Women and Equalities to approve the revised Services Code of Practice. Swift J described this process as "very unsatisfactory." This engages the doctrine of legitimate expectation (R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213^[12]), though its application requires qualification. In public law, the doctrine protects reliance on clear representations by public authorities. But it does not straightforwardly operate as a defence in private law proceedings: an employer sued for gender reassignment discrimination cannot simply plead "the EHRC told me to do it." What reasonable reliance may do is inform the proportionality assessment in determining justification for indirect discrimination.

4. Proportionality and Contextual Enforcement

The Equality Act 2010 (Schedule 3, Part 7) allows single-sex services only if providing them is a "proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim"^[13]. Separately, Regulation 20 mandates sex-separated rooms as a health-and-safety requirement^[14]. These are parallel obligations from different legislative families. Swift J emphasised that any exclusion of trans persons from a facility would be lawful only if objectively justified under the applicable standard. In practice, this means compliance is assessed on reasonableness. At paragraph 40, Swift J rejected any notion that businesses could be expected to "police" toilet usage on a "person by person and day by day" basis, calling such strict logic "divorced from reality and from any sensible model of human behaviour"^[15]. The standard is good faith, not perfection.

5. Comparative Perspectives

England's approach sits within a broader comparative trajectory, though the position of other systems is more nuanced than commonly assumed. Major civil law jurisdictions maintain ignorantia juris as the default rule but have adopted narrow statutory exceptions for unavoidable error: Germany's section 17 of the Strafgesetzbuch recognises unavoidable mistake of law (Verbotsirrtum) as a complete defence^[16], while France's Article 122-3 of the Code pénal provides a defence of invincible error of law^[17]. Under the ECHR, Article 7 incorporates qualitative requirements that laws be "accessible and foreseeable," a principle originally developed under Article 10's "prescribed by law" test (Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245^[18]) and imported into Article 7 by Kokkinakis v Greece (1993)^[19] and the Grand Chamber in Del Río Prada v Spain (2013)^[20]. Good Law Project aligns England within these broader trends.

Conclusion

Good Law Project shows that the maxim "ignorance of the law is no defence" remains intact, but its application has been qualified by a multi-layered framework. Today it is a starting point, not an absolute rule. The State is obligated to make the law accessible through guidance issued under specific statutory powers, and good-faith reliance on such guidance is a strong mitigating factor, at least in regulatory contexts. However, the judgment also reveals the limits of this softening: compliance with one statutory obligation does not exhaust an employer's duties under anti-discrimination law. The modern framework generates not only safe harbours but potential collisions between coexisting legal regimes.

In short, English law still says you cannot plead ignorance, but it measures knowledge by a reasonable person standard. It punishes wilful blindness, not reasonable mistakes. The comparative picture confirms this trajectory: both continental codified exceptions for unavoidable error and the ECHR's Article 7 foreseeability requirements reflect a shared recognition that the modern regulatory state cannot demand omniscience from its citizens. The maxim still holds, but tempered by reasonableness, proportionality, and the honest confrontation of competing obligations that remains unresolved.

[1] R (Good Law Project Ltd & Ors) v Commission for Equality and Human Rights [2026] EWHC 279 (Admin).

[2] For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16.

[3] Gender Recognition Act 2004, s 9(3).

[4] Gender Recognition Act 2004, s 9(1).

[5] Equality Act 2010, s 7.

[6] Equality Act 2010, sch 3 pt 7.

[7] Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/3004, reg 20(2)(c).

[8] Equality Act 2006, s 13(1)(d).

[9] Good Law Project (n 1) [40].

[10] Good Law Project (n 1) [42].

[11] Equality Act 2010, pt 5.

[12] R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213.

[13] Equality Act 2010, sch 3 pt 7.

[14] Workplace Regulations (n 7) reg 20(2)(c).

[15] Good Law Project (n 1) [40].

[16] Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code) s 17.

[17] Code pénal (French Penal Code) art 122-3.

[18] Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245.

[19] Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397.

[20] Del Río Prada v Spain (2013) 58 EHRR 37.

Written by Katherine O'Toole’s 

We would like to thank all participants for their submissions and congratulate this year’s winners.

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026. Read more about the competition here:
https://www.cnsolicitors.com/litigation-essay-competition-2026/

by admin