This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026.

Danielle Bugden explores the impact of the Mazur decision on litigation practice, focusing on key areas of change and compliance considerations.

 

The Mazur Decision and Its Impact on Litigation Practice

The Mazur decision has sent genuine shockwaves through the UK litigation market. For many years, firms operated on the assumption that the conduct of litigation could be carried out by unqualified fee-earners, provided they worked within an authorised firm and were supervised by a solicitor. Entire business models developed on that understanding. In Mazur, however, Mr Justice Sheldon made clear that this assumption was wrong. Properly interpreted, s.21(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007 does not extend authorisation to employees of regulated firms; it merely subjects them to regulatory discipline. The statutory scheme draws a firm line: the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity that may only be exercised by an authorised person or someone falling within a specific statutory exemption. Supervision alone is not enough.

This clarification is more than a technical correction. It challenges the structure of modern litigation practice and raises serious questions about how cases are staffed, managed and costed. The decision has particularly significant implications for bulk litigation firms, costs recovery, and access to justice. This essay argues that Mazur exposes a structural tension between theory and litigation practice, and that meaningful compliance will require changes to case management systems, internal supervision models and professional accountability frameworks.

 

Context

The starting point is the statutory framework. Under s.12 of the Legal Services Act 2007, the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity[1]. Schedule 2 defines that to include issuing proceedings, performing ancillary functions in relation to proceedings, and any steps required in prosecuting or defending a claim[2]. A reserved legal activity may only be carried out by an authorised person such as a solicitor holding a current practising certificate, or by an exempt person within a defined statutory category[3].

The difficulty in Mazur arose from the interpretation of s.21(3) LSA 2007[4]. Many firms understood this provision to mean that employees of an authorised body were themselves entitled to carry out reserved activities, provided they did under supervision. On that reading, the regulatory status of the firm effectively extended to its staff. Mr Justice Sheldon rejected that construction[5]. Section 21(3), properly understood, ensures that employees of authorised bodies are subject to the same regulatory and disciplinary framework as the body itself; it does not confer authorisation to perform reserved legal activities. Authorisation is personal and statutory, not derivative[6].

The judgment reinforces that an individual is either entitled to conduct litigation or they are not. There is no legal supervised authorisation. While unqualified staff may assist with preparatory or administrative tasks, the moment an individual takes a step amounting to issuing proceedings, corresponding formally with the court, or exercising independent judgment, the question becomes one of fact and degree[7]. If that step amounts to the conduct of litigation and the individual are not authorised or exempt, the act is unlawful[8].

This is significant because modern litigation practice often blurs the line between support and conduct. Mazur forces that line back into sharp focus.

The Impacted Areas

The most immediate and significant impact of Mazur will be felt by firms operating high-volume litigation models. Bulk personal injury and conveyancing practices have structures in which large numbers of paralegals manage substantial caseloads under the supervision of a smaller cohort of solicitors. That model is only sustainable if supervision is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Mazur makes clear that it is not. If the conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity,[9] then the individual performing that conduct must be personally authorised under s13.[10] Supervision cannot convert unauthorised into authorised.

This has structural implications. If paralegals are corresponding substantively with the court, issuing proceedings, signing statements of truth, or exercising independent procedural judgment, those steps may amount in substance to the conduct of litigation. If so, and the individual is not authorised or exempt, the act is unlawful.[11] For firms whose profitability depends on delegation at scale, compliance will require either a significant increase in authorised fee-earner involvement or a fundamental redesign of case allocation models. The decision therefore strikes at the economic foundations of commoditised litigation.

A second area of acute impact is costs recovery. Where a bill of costs reflects substantial time spent by unqualified fee-earners undertaking tasks that amount to the conduct of litigation, paying parties are likely to scrutinise those entries. If work was performed unlawfully, arguments may arise as to whether the costs are irrecoverable on grounds of illegality or lack of entitlement. The Court of Appeal has previously emphasised that the statutory prohibition on unauthorised practice is a matter of substance rather than form.[12] Mazur provides defendants and insurers with a framework to challenge whether tasks were properly chargeable as litigation work. Even where proceedings themselves are not struck out, the costs consequences may be significant.

There are also procedural risks. The Civil Procedure Rules require that statements of case be verified by a statement of truth,[13] and that certain documents be signed by a legal representative where one is instructed.[14] If a statement of case is issued or signed by an individual not entitled to conduct litigation, questions may arise as to the validity of the step taken. While the courts are reluctant to invalidate proceedings for procedural irregularity alone,[15] Mazur introduces the possibility that what appeared to be a mere irregularity may involve a breach of a statutory prohibition. That distinction matters. It increases the risk of satellite litigation concerning authority, wasted costs orders against firms,[16] and potential professional negligence exposure.

Beyond commercial firms, the decision has broader consequences. Legal aid providers, law centres and local authorities often rely on paralegals and CILEX practitioners progressing toward independent practice rights. Restricting the scope of work that may be undertaken risks increasing the cost-of-service delivery in already strained areas of practice. There is a tension between the regulatory clarity reinforced by Mazur and the realities of access to justice. However, that tension is inherent in the statutory scheme itself. The LSA deliberately reserves certain activities in the public interest.[17] Mazur does not create that restriction; it enforces it.

Taken together, these impacts demonstrate that the decision is not confined to regulatory compliance. It requires firms to reconsider who is conducting litigation on their files, and whether their current structures reflect the personal nature of statutory authorisation.

 

Steps for Compliance

Mazur confirms that authorisation to conduct litigation is personal and statutory under ss12 and 13 LSA 2007.[18] Compliance therefore requires structural change, not supervision.

First, firms should undertake a targeted audit of files to identify who has been conducting litigation. The relevant question is who has issued proceedings, corresponded formally with the court, signed statements of truth, or exercised independent procedural judgment? If steps were taken by unauthorised individuals, firms must consider corrective action and assess regulatory exposure. The SRA Code of Conduct for Firms requires effective governance, compliance systems and proper supervision.[19] A failure to identify systemic breaches risks compounding the problem.

Secondly, case management processes must ensure that reserved activities are demonstrably carried out by authorised persons. This may include restricting court-filing access, requiring documented solicitor sign-off before issuing proceedings, and clearly recording the exercise of independent judgment by an authorised fee-earner. Such measures provide evidence that the requirement in s13 has been met[20] and reduce disputes concerning the validity of statements of truth under CPR r22.[21]

Thirdly, supervision models must be reassessed. The SRA Principles require solicitors and firms to uphold the rule of law and maintain public trust.[22] Where unauthorised staff effectively conduct litigation autonomously, the issue is not merely procedural but regulatory. In high-volume environments, this may require lower supervision ratios or greater authorised involvement in strategic decisions and pleadings.

Finally, firms should consider reporting and insurance obligations. Where past conduct may breach s14 LSA 2007,[23] managers must evaluate whether a serious breach is reportable to the SRA.[24] Early remediation is likely to carry less regulatory risk than disclosure.

Mazur does not prohibit delegation; It requires that delegation stops short of reserved activity unless the individual is authorised. Firms that realign their structures accordingly will be best placed to withstand judicial and regulatory scrutiny.

 

Conclusion

The Mazur decision is a definitive reminder that the conduct of litigation is a personal statutory entitlement, not a delegable function. Firms can no longer rely on supervision or employment within an authorised body to validate unauthorised practice. The ruling has immediate implications for high-volume litigation models, costs recovery, and access to justice, and exposes structural vulnerabilities in case management and supervision.

Compliance will require deliberate changes: audit of files, documented sign-off for all reserved activities, reassessment of supervision models, and proactive engagement with the SRA where breaches are identified.[25] Firms that embed these measures into their governance structures, rather than treating them as a one-off response, will mitigate regulatory and procedural risk and preserve both client and public confidence in the profession. Mazur is not just a challenge; it is an opportunity to strengthen the integrity and professionalism of litigation practice in the UK.

 

[1] Legal Sevices Act 2007, s 12(1).

[2] Legal Services Act 2007, sch 2 para 4.

[3] Legal Services Act 2007, s 13.

[4] Legal Services Act 2007, s 21(3).

[5] Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)

[6] Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2005] EWCA Civ 1507, [2006] 1 WLR 2126.

[7] Baxter v Doble [2023] EWHC 486 (KB).

[8] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[9] Legal service Act 2007, s 12(1), sch 2 para 4.

[10] Legal Service Act 2007, s 13.

[11] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[12] Ndole Assets Ltd v Designer M&E Services UK Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2865.

[13] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1.

[14] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1(6).

[15] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 3.10.

[16]Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 46.8.

[17] Legal Services Act 2007, s 1.

[18] Legal Service Act 2007, ss 12-13.

[19] Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) paras 2.1, 3.2–3.5.

[20] Legal Services Act 2007, s 13.

[21] Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r 22.1.

[22] Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA Principles (2019) Principles 1–2.

[23] Legal Services Act 2007, s 14.

[24] Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) para 7.7.

[25] Legal Services Act 2007, ss 12–14; Solicitors Regulation Authority, Code of Conduct for Firms (2019) paras 2.1, 3.2–3.5, 7.7.

Written by Danielle Bugden

We would like to thank all participants for their submissions and congratulate this year’s winners.

This essay forms part of our Litigation Essay Competition 2026. Read more about the competition here:
https://www.cnsolicitors.com/litigation-essay-competition-2026/